Senator David Norris' address to Seanad Eireann (the Irish Senate)

In Sept. 2007, fourteen months before Ireland's bank bailout, I resigned from my position as the Risk Manager of UniCredit Bank Ireland. I did that in order not to incriminate myself. I have spent the last 4 years seeking justice. On Feb. 23rd., 2010, I was fortunate to have Senator David Norris raise the matter in Seanad Eireann (the Irish Senate), and request a response from the Minister of Finance, Mr. Brian Lenihan. Senator Norris concluded by stating that:
"...there is ministerial responsibility in this matter. This is a grossly serious matter which has been reported to the Financial Regulator. A man has lost his job as a result. He honourably resigned. The degree of breach was 40 times the accepted margin. This is a disaster. If we are not prepared to face the issue and investigate it when it has been laid before the House, there is absolutely no hope for the financial system or its reputation worldwide...How can the Financial Regulator investigate himself? He was in breach of his responsibility."
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/seanad/2010/02/23/00012.asp
In Nov. 2011, Emma Alberici, Europe correspondent for ABC TV, told my story as part of her documentary 'Going Rogue' which featured Nick Leeson and Sir John Vickers among other interviewees. It is ironic that at a time when the Irish tax-payer is bailing out un-secured bond holders, my story which occurred in Dublin, is deemed of interest to the Australian TV license payer. Please click on 'play video' on the following link:
http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2011/s3367080.htm
VRT, Belgian state-TV, aired this interview with me on March 6th., 2013. My Interview begins in minute 27:
Het verdriet van Europa: Zeepbellen blazen (The sadness of Europe: Bursting bubbles)
VRT, Belgian state-TV, released extra footage of my interview on March 8th., 2013. (in English):
Whistleblower.IRL@gmail.com

Thursday, 6 September 2012

Pandora's box begins to open despite the best efforts of The Central Bank & McCann FitzGerald on behalf of UniCredit - Upcoming report in Village magazine


Michael Smith, editor & owner of Village magazine, authorised me this evening to publish the following update which is to appear in Village magazine next week:
Cover-up
Jonathan Sugarman, a former Risk Manager, blew the whistle on his then employer Unicredit Bank, Italy’s biggest, which in 2007 failed dramatically to maintain proper liquidity ratios – which keep banks
from customer runs on their funds. Village was the first to name Unicredit, despite threats from McCann FitzGerald solicitors that they would sue if implicated. Subsequently the Central Bank Financial Regulator’s Department, announced that it would consider any information offered about the affair “in confidence” but when Sugarman contacted them they revealed that in fact they reserved the right to report him to the Gardai for criminal activity if he offered the Central Bank information that implicated him. In the end – in February - Sugarman bravely nevertheless met the Central Bank, which indicated that they had already asked Unicredit to recreate reports dating back to the alleged breaches in 2007 but gave no information as
to how their investigations were proceeding. Subequently the Central Bank indicated, with no reasoning, that it was closing the file – and notably failed to produce minutes. When the Irish Independent’s Mark Keenan recently started sniffing about the issue, the
Central Bank finally sent minutes of the meeting. It is not clear if the file remains closed, or why, and the Central Bank, for the moment 
is keeping schtum.


The implications of the piece above are far reaching. For the moment, I will touch only on some of them:

1. May 2011 was the first time the Central Bank of Ireland invited me to their offices to discuss the liquidity breach I had officially  reported in the summer of 2007. I was invited to come and talk to them "confidentially". During the meeting it became clear that the confidentiality undertaking pertained merely to my identity. I was then threatened by CB officials with the possibility of having to face criminal proceedings as a result of disclosing any facts about what transpired during my employment as UniCredit Ireland's Risk Manager.

2. Having followed the Eugene McErlean case closely, I requested the Central Bank's permission to record our meetings. The answer was NO. Please see the e-mail below for further reference. It took eight long years for the Central Bank of Ireland to admit that it had been less than professional in dealing with the issues McErlean brought to the CB's attention as a senior AIB auditor. Kathleen Barrington reported in the Sunday Business Post in October 2010 that:

"The significance of the apology issued by Elderfield last week should not be underestimated. It was generously and graciously phrased, and it left no doubt that McErlean had been doing his job properly and that he had been badly let down by the regulatory authorities. Elderfield said it was his opinion that ‘‘some matters could have been better handled by the public authorities involved’’ and added that he was ‘‘sorry for any unintended distress caused for Mr McErlean’’http://kathleenbarrington.blogspot.com/2010/10/aib-mysteries-still-unexplained.html

One has to wonder why I was not allowed to record my meetings with the Central Bank of Ireland. After all, I was the one doing the talking, they were doing the listening, why would I not be allowed to record my own voice?!? Unfortunately for the Central Bank of Ireland, I was accompanied to my meetings with them by a person who is well known in Dublin and formally-educated in Irish law. 


3. A second meeting with the Central Bank of Ireland took place on February 23rd. this year.  When minutes of our meeting failed to arrive, the CB was contacted seeking clarification. A reply dated June 6th. was received; it did not include any minutes of the February meeting and stated that the case is now closed

This might be pure co-incidence, but on the day that Mark Keenan's first of two references to my story within last week appeared in the Irish Independent, the Central Bank issued minutes of of the meeting. Yes, the minutes of a meeting that took place in February were issued in August after the case had been declared closed in June. 

A crucial aspect of the minutes that were issued last week is the complete absence of an admission made repeatedly during the meeting by Central Bank officials. Whilst there is no recording of the meeting (in this age of alleged transparency & probity in Irish financial services), I was fortunately accompanied to the meeting by the person whom I refer to above. 


4. Anyone wishing to write to me regarding the above, should please do so to the following address:

Alternatively, comments/questions can be raised publicly on-line on the following thread on PoliticalWorld.org. I am very grateful for all the encouragement and support I have received from PoliticalWorld members.


5. I can not over-state my gratitude to Michael Smith who decided to persist and publish his coverage of the liquidity breaches at UniCredit Ireland, despite ferocious threats from McCann Fitgerald - one of Ireland's biggest law firms. Please see the following article which was published in Village magazine in December 2010:


============================================================

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Oakes Peter <peter.oakes@centralbank.ie>
Date: 18 April 2011 21:28
Subject: RE: Jonathan Sugarman - meeting with the Central Bank, Wednesday 4th May
To: Jonathan Sugarman




Dear Mr Sugarman

I had assumed that the meeting was confirmed for 4th May and that we only had to settle on the time for the meeting (proposed for 10.30a.m.)  I apologise if this was not clear from the exchange of emails. 

Please note that the agenda is simply an open invitation to you to inform the Central Bank’s banking supervisory division of any matter or issue, coming to your attention out of your employment with Unicredit, which you may wish to share with the Central Bank. 

It is not the Central Bank’s intention that the meeting be recorded by either party.  I note that you wish Mr X to attend the meeting.  In what capacity do you propose Mr X attend the meeting please?  For example is Mr X retained to provide you legal advice or would he be attending for another purpose?    

Would you please provide a postal correspondence address and telephone number? 

Going forward Mr Frank Brosnan of the Central Bank (or one of his colleagues) will correspond with you.

I will now be away from the office for a number of weeks.  My PA’s email is s....@centralbank.ie.  Ms SC will forward any emails you might send her to Mr Brosnan’s office until you and Mr Brosnan are in direct contact.


Regards

Peter Oakes
Director, Enforcement
Central Bank of Ireland

The Irish Independent referred to UniCredit Ireland again last Thursday

Mark Keenan reported in The Independent last week that:

"...In 2005, Dublin-based Cologne RE played a pivotal role in a sham scheme to inflate the reserves of US insurance giant AIG -- the scandal that originally brought the IFSC its international "wild west" monicker. US Investigators heard that "Cologne RE was seen as an ideal location for the fraud because Dublin "did not report to anyone" and so avoided the "North American problem" of financial regulation.
In 2007, German bank Sachsen LB needed a bailout when it was discovered that its two Dublin-based investment vehicles had insufficient assets to cover their liabilities.There was the Depfa bank scandal. The subsidiary of Hypo real Estate ran into trouble in 2008, eventually prompting a bailout by the German government that is still the biggest in Irish banking history.
The regulator still won't reveal what action, if any, had been taken against Unicredit's IFSC subsidiary in 2007 when whistleblower banker Jonathan Sugarman, then its risk manager, shopped his bank to the Irish regulator after alleging that its liquidity reserves were 20pc below the legally required limit. Sugarman has since claimed the regulator's office did nothing about it.
Meantime, 16 executives from the parent company, including the CEO, are going on trial in Italy for cooking the books in that year.
So what did Mr Elderfield first make of Dublin when he arrived here from Bermuda back in 2009? Was there much cleaning up to do?..."
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/ifsc-banks-circle-their-wagons-as-elderfield-tries-to-tame-wild-west-3214910.html


And in case you were wondering what took Mr. Elderfield to Bermuda in the first place, here is a quote from The Independent in June 2010:

"THE watchdog brought in to clean up Ireland's banks was the official responsible for supervising Northern Rock in the months before the collapsed bank applied for its first bailout.
The Irish Independent has learned that Financial Regulator Matthew Elderfield oversaw the regulation of Northern Rock in the three months to August 2007....
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/regulator-helped-supervise-northern-rock-before-bailout-2211123.html

Monday, 27 August 2012

Regulator is silent over action taken on Unicredit complaint - today's Irish Independent


By Mark Keenan
Monday August 27 2012

THE Financial Regulator has refused to reveal what action has been taken in regard to a serious complaint of liquidity irregularities made to his office in 2007 by a whistle-blowing former banker regarding Unicredit Bank Ireland.

It was alleged that the regulator received details that Unicredit Bank Ireland, an offshoot of Italy's biggest bank, had been operating in the IFSC with liquidity levels vastly below what was required by law. In addition, Jonathan Sugarman, a former executive with Unicredit Bank Ireland, has consistently claimed that the Irish regulator's office took no action regarding his complaint. Mr Sugarman was appointed risk manager for Unicredit Bank Ireland back in 2007 when it had an operation worth $50bn (€39.94bn) based in Dublin's IFSC.

Upon assuming the new position, Mr Sugarman claimed to have noticed serious irregularities in the bank's liquidity levels. The bank was required by law to keep assets and cash in reserve equivalent to 90pc of its liabilities. Mr Sugarman says he believed Unicredit was operating in Dublin with cover of just 70pc. Having called in independent consultants to confirm his fears, he then claims to have raised the matter with his superior at the bank. He says he was told "not to worry."

However, Mr Sugarman resigned his position and claims he then approached the Irish Financial Regulator's office in late 2007 to report the irregularities -- as required by law.

Fraud

He claims the Irish regulator did nothing about his complaint.

Alessandro Profumo, who was CEO of the accused bank's parent company, Unicredit -- from 1997 to 2010 and during the period covered by Mr Sugarman's complaint -- is now preparing to go on trial for fraud in Italy on 
October 1.

Mr Profumo and 16 past and present employees of Unicredit will have to answer charges that they had cooked the books to defraud the Italian taxpayer out of €245m taxes on profits.
The charges relate directly to practices during the period 2007 to 2008.

When contacted on this matter, the Financial Regulator Matthew Elderfield said in a statement that: "The Central Bank met with Mr Sugarman and received some information from him and took the appropriate action."
When the Irish Independent enquired about what the regulator meant by "appropriate action", the regulator's office said there would be no more correspondence on the matter.

Late last year investigators from Australia's state-run ABC TV network also contacted the Irish regulator's office to ask what had come of Mr Sugarman's complaint against Unicredit Ireland. In a reply late last year, ABC says it received a letter from the Irish Financial Regulator's office to say that it was still examining the allegations first brought by Mr Sugarman.

Yesterday Fianna Fail's finance spokesman Michael McGrath said: "It is essential that the Irish Financial Regulator should account for how the complaint -- dating to late 2007 and relating to liquidity reserves -- has been dealt with."

Mr Sugarman could not be contacted by the Irish Independent.


Friday, 29 June 2012

Italian & French translations of Z.G. Herman's letter to the Financial Times


Thanks to my friends PP & MF, here are loose translations of Z.G. Herman's letter to the Financial Times of 18 June 2012. Please see my previous blog posting for the original text in English.

Italian: 
"Nei film di Hollywood le situazioni di crisi hanno quasi sempre un lieto fine e ne siamo fortemente impressi, in realtà per ottenere lo stesso risultato non siamo disposti a cambiare. Che cosa significa che in Grecia abbia vinto un partito o l’altro? Assolutamente niente. Devono ancora formare un governo, che ancora dovrà applicare effettivamente le misure necessarie (e non è ancora chiaro quali siano) soprattutto il popolo dovrà essere in grado di lavorare effettivamente con tali misure. Questo solo per la Grecia.
La Spagna è la prossima, poi l’Italia, quindi anche i paesi del Nord Europa senza parlare degli Stati Uniti, Cina, India, Australia e tanti altri. Perché?
Perché quello che stiamo "a guardare" non è una tragedia greca, nemmeno spagnola, neanche europea, il mondo intero è spinto con tenacia da un sistema che si basa sull'illusione di una costante crescita quantitativa economica in un sistema a circuito chiuso, che richiede sovrapproduzione e sovraconsumo basato su un aumento del debito. Creiamo bolle dopo bolle che cercano di ingannare il sistema, siamo governati da leggi naturali rigorose che non possono essere ingannate. Oggi sono state scoperte.
Siamo noi al centro di questo incubo di contesto globale, un sistema totalmente interconnesso, per farla breve: siamo tutti incatenati su una barca che affonda.
Qual’è la nostra prossima mossa? "


French:
‘’Les catastrophes ont toujours une issue sans conséquences dans les films hollywoodiens et nous en sommes profondément imprégnés, dans la réalité pour obtenir le même résultat nous ne sommes pas disposés à changer. Que signifie la victoire d’un parti ou d’un autre en Grèce ? Absolument rien. Ils doivent encore former un gouvernement, qui devra ensuite appliquer les mesures nécessaires (il n’est pas encore clair lesquelles) le peuple devra surtout être en mesure de travailler effectivement avec de telles mesures. Cela seulement pour la Grèce.
L’Espagne suit, ensuite l’Italie, et même les pays du nord de l’Europe, sans mentionner les USA, la Chine, l’Inde, l’Australie et tous les autres. Pourquoi?
Parce que ce que nous sommes en train d’ « observer » n’est pas un drame grec, même pas espagnol, européen non plus. Le monde entier est entrainé avec force dans un système basé sur l’illusion d’une croissance économique en circuit fermé qui requiert surproduction et surconsommation avec une dette croissante. Nous créons bulle sur bulle voulant fausser le système mais ce dernier est basé sur des lois naturelles qui ne peuvent être ignorées. Nous les découvrons aujourd’hui.
Nous nous trouvons au centre de ce cauchemar, dans un système global, complètement interdépendant, pour résumer, nous sommes enchainés les uns aux autres sur un bateau en train de couler.
Que faire maintenant ?“ 




Saturday, 23 June 2012

An observation about the current state of the global financial mess



A friend of mine sent this on to me this week. I have no idea who the author of this letter to the Financial Times is, but I think his observations are thought provoking. Especially at a time when the papers are full with the calming voices of our 'Dear', but dangerously incompetent, leaders. Well said Mr. Z. G. Herman, whoever and wherever you are.

"We are so much brainwashed by Hollywood movies that we crave a happy ending every time there is a crisis situation, but we are not willing to change in order to get it.  What does it mean that certain parties won in Greece? Absolutely nothing.  They still have to form a government, that government still has to actually apply necessary measures (and it is still unclear what those are) and most importantly the public will need to be able to actually work through those measures.  And this is only Greece.
Spain is next, then Italy, then even the Northern European countries not to mention the US, China, India, Australia and everybody. Why?
Because what we are "watching" is not a Greek drama, not even Spanish, not even European.The whole world is stubbornly pushing on with a system that is based on the illusion of constant quantitative economic growth in a closed, finite system, requiring overproduction and over consumption based on increasing debt.  We blow bubbles after bubbles trying to cheat the system but we live among strict natural laws that cannot be cheated.  And today we were found out.
On top of all this false dream we also find ourselves in a global, totally interconnected system, in other words we are chained together on a sinking boat.
So what is our next move?"
          Published in the Financial Times, 18 June 2012.

     

Monday, 7 November 2011

In response to e-mails received, a reminder of the article in Village magazine:



Still waiting for the truth from the regulator 

- Village, Dec. 2010

UniCredit breached liquidity requirements in 2007.  Matthew Elderfield nods.  The interconnectedness of banking dysfunctionality.
Michael Smith
There is a general official view that Ireland’s ethical delinquencies are in the past.  Corrupt planning stopped when the tribunals started; and bad bank-regulation stopped with the demise of Pat Neary and the production of two limited and innocuous reports by Patrick Honohan and Klaus Regling. Inconveniently for a country that has started to see regulation in black (then) and white (now) terms, the general view does not reflect the reality. Hold tight for a mind-boggling trip through the complexity of banking dysfunctionality....
Matthew Elderfield - the Financial Regulator

whistleblower.irl@gmail.com